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Abstract
This paper uses an equilibrium matching framework to study jointly the optimal
private provision of severance pay and the allocational and welfare consequences of
government intervention in excess of private arrangements. Firms insure risk-averse
workers by means of simple explicit employment contracts. Contracts can be rene-
gotiated ex post by mutual consent. It is shown that the privately optimal severance
payment is bounded below by the fall in lifetime wealth associated with job loss.
Simulations show that, despite contract incompleteness, legislated dismissal costs
largely in excess of such private optimum are eﬀectively undone by renegotiation
and have only a small allocational eﬀect. Welfare falls. Yet, for deviations from
laissez faire in line with those observed for most OECD countries, the welfare loss
is small.
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11 Introduction
Employment contracts often contain explicit severance payments provisions1. Further-
more, in many countries minimum levels of severance payments and other forms of em-
ployment protection are enshrined in legislation. The existence of such measures is diﬃ-
cult to understand in the light of standard labour market models in which homogeneous2
workers maximise expected labour income and wages are perfectly ﬂexible.
From a general equilibrium perspective, risk-neutral behaviour requires perfect in-
surance or complete asset markets. Together with wage ﬂexibility and unconstrained
side-payments, perfect insurance implies that any spillover between a worker and her
current employer is internalised and the market equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. As
pointed out by Lazear (1990), employment protection measures have no useful role to
play in such environment and there is no reason why a ﬁrm which takes aggregate quan-
tities as given should oﬀer them. In brief, it is hard for models based on risk-neutral
labour market behaviour to provide a role for job security measures when wages can ad-
just freely. As argued in Pissarides (2001), this implies that “...much of the debate about
employment protection has been conducted within a framework that is not suitable for a
proper evaluation of its role in modern labour markets.”
This paper studies the optimal private provision of one form of employment protec-
tion, severance pay, in an environment in which it plays an economic role as risk-averse
workers can only imperfectly insure against idiosyncratic labour income shocks. This
optimal contracting problem is cast within Mortensen and Pissarides’s (1994) equilib-
rium matching model. Using an equilibrium framework, the paper can explore jointly
the privately optimal size of severance pay and the allocational and welfare eﬀects of a
mandated discipline which deviates from it.
1For the US, Bishow and Parsons (2004) document that, over the period 1980-2001, roughly 40 per
cent of workers in establishments with more than 100 employees, and 20 per cent in establishments below
such threshold, were covered by severance payment clauses. For the UK, the 1990 Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey reveals that 51 per cent of union companies bargain over the size of non-statutory
severance pay for non-manual workers and 42 per cent for manual workers (Millward et al. 1992).
Even for Spain, a country usually associated with high level of state-mandated employment protection,
Lorences et al. (1995) document that between 8 and 100 per cent of collective agreements in a given
sector establish levels of severance pay in excess of legislated measures.
2See Fella (2005) for a model with heterogeneous workers in which consensual termination restrictions
increase ﬁrms’ investment in the general training of unskilled workers.
2The two key features of this exercise are: (i) simple explicit contracts, and (ii) rene-
gotiation by mutual consent.
Feature (i) rules out reputation-based complete implicit contracts and ensures that
excessive mandated severance pay is non-neutral. This would not be the case with risk-
neutral ﬁrms and complete contracting, as the latter would be a substitute for complete
insurance markets. Excessive severance pay legislation would also be undone by a sim-
ple intertemporal contract mandating that workers rebated to ﬁrms the excess of the
legislated termination pay over its privately optimal level. Since courts are unlikely to
enforce contracts aimed at circumventing legislation, though, such an arrangement would
be feasible only if supported by a self-enforcing implicit agreement. Yet the arrangement
cannot be self-enforcing as a worker about to be ﬁred would have no ex post incentive to
honour such an ex ante pledge3.
While feature (i) stacks the odds in favour of non-neutrality, feature (ii) imposes the
natural, joint-rationality constraint that a ﬁrm-worker pair do not leave money on the
table if they can avoid it. It allows the parties to potentially circumvent legislation, if
there are mutual gains from doing so, but only by means of ex post, spot side payments.
Since such ex post side payments are state-dependent, insurance is possibly imperfect
and excessive mandated severance pay is a priori non-neutral.
The paper establishes a lower bound for the optimal severance payment size. This
equals the fall in lifetime wealth associated with job loss. Hence, job security in the form
of positive redundancy pay is part of an optimal contract whenever workers enjoy positive
rents. Positive workers’ rents imply costly mobility and call for insurance against job loss.
By yielding a closed-form lower bound for the optimal severance pay the model pro-
vides a metric against which to assess the extent to which observed legislated measures
are excessive. Such a metric is used to construct a series for the lower bound on optimal
severance pay for a sample of OECD countries and compare it to the corresponding series
for legislated payments. It turns out that for a large proportion of these countries man-
dated payments do not signiﬁcantly exceed, and are often signiﬁcantly lower than, their
optimal lower bound. Even for those countries for which this is not the case, the observed
3Privately negotiated severance payment are also unenforceable through reputation alone in the stan-
dard matching framework with anonymity in which a ﬁrm coincides with one job and, when a job becomes
unproﬁtable, there are no third parties that can punish a ﬁrm that reneges on an implicit contract.
3deviation from the private optimum is inconsistent with quantitatively important changes
in the allocation of labour in the light of the model’s numerical results. Therefore, the
model implies a direction of causation from factors which generate high workers’ rents
and unemployment duration to high severance pay but rules out the reverse. The same
causation also goes from low unemployment beneﬁts to large severance payments, coeteris
paribus.
Despite their a priori non-neutrality, legislated severance payments above private op-
tima have small allocational eﬀects. The reason is that a legislated severance payment in
excess of the private optimum just determines the maximum transfer in case of separa-
tion. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm pays it only if the productivity shock is so low that the ﬁrm
cannot credibly threat to continue the match at the contract wage. If the productivity
realization is not so negative, yet below its reservation value, the parties agree to label
the separation a quit and exchange a lower severance payment which equals the ﬁrm’s
present value of proﬁts at the contract wage and current productivity realization. This
is Pareto optimal as it makes the worker strictly better oﬀ and leaves the ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between continuation and separation. As the legislated severance payment is renegotiated
when the marginal job is destroyed it has only a minor, general equilibrium, impact on
the reservation productivity and the job destruction rate. The wage component of the
contract falls to rebalance the parties’ respective shares of the surplus from a new match.
While the allocation of labour is hardly aﬀected, very large deviations from the private
optimum may have considerable negative eﬀects on workers’ welfare as, by overinsuring
against job loss, they increase income ﬂuctuation relative to laissez-faire. Yet, for only
two countries in our dataset are observed deviations large enough to imply an upper
bound on the welfare loss equal to a third of a percentage point fall.
The model is related to a number of papers in the literature. MacLeod and Malcom-
son (1993) is the closest antecedent to the contracting framework studied in the paper.
In a risk-neutral framework they show how incomplete contracts of the ﬁxed price and
severance payment variety can solve the hold up problem, as they are infrequently rene-
gotiated. Severance payments reduce the probability of renegotiation of the ﬁxed-price
component of the contract. This paper applies MacLeod and Malcomson’s insight about
the infrequent renegotiation of simple, explicit, ﬁxed-price contracts to the optimal pri-
4vate provision of insurance. This contrasts with the implicit contract literature pioneered
by Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974). That literature was mainly concerned with estab-
lishing minimal restrictions on contracts or information that could generate a deviation
from the ﬁrst-best, full-insurance outcome and a trade-oﬀ between risk sharing and pro-
ductive eﬃciency. By assuming that reputational considerations ruled out ﬁrm-initiated
renegotiation of implicit agreements that literature resolved the trade-oﬀ in favour of risk
sharing. Instead, by allowing for renegotiation by mutual consent our paper emphasises
the constraint that ex post eﬃciency imposes on insurance provision by means of simple,
explicit contracts.
Recently, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), Bertola (2004) and Pissarides (2004) have
explored the role of employment protection within a fully dynamic framework with risk-
averse workers. Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) show that exogenously-imposed severance
payments can have large positive eﬀects on employment and welfare in a model with
costly frictions and self-insurance. Bertola (2004) shows, within a competitive equilibrium
environment, that collectively administered income transfers may improve welfare and
eﬃciency by reducing the consumption ﬂuctuation associated with job mobility. Both
papers do not allow for optimal private contracts. We show that allowing for optimal
private contracting implies there is no welfare-improving role for legislated employment
protection. Yet, Pareto optimal renegotiation implies that the allocational eﬀects and
welfare costs of excessive government intervention are small.
Pissarides (2004) shows that optimal private contracts feature severance pay and,
possibly, advance notice. Being partial equilibrium though, his model cannot address the
allocational eﬀects of excessive government intervention. On the other hand, contrary
to this paper, Pissarides (2004) allows for dismissal delays (advance notice). He shows
that, as long as state-provided unemployment insurance is low enough for it not to make
it worthwhile for the parties to take advantage of such third-party income transfer, dis-
missal delays provide additional (imperfect) insurance against the uncertain length of
unemployment spells at a lower cost to the ﬁrm than severance pay.
A related literature studies the optimal size and time path of unemployment bene-
ﬁts in search and matching models with risk-averse workers. For tractability, it studies
environment in which severance pay has little or no role. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
5show that positive unemployment beneﬁts increase eﬃciency and welfare relative to lais-
sez faire in a directed search model without job loss. The matching models with wage
bargaining and hand-to-mouth consumers of Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), Fredriksson
and Holmlund (2001) and Coles and Masters (2006) also imply that the optimal size of
unemployment beneﬁts is strictly positive.
Finally, Blanchard and Tirole (2005) study the optimal joint design of unemployment
insurance and employment protection in a static, partial-equilibrium setup. Because the
model is static, it blurs the distinction between severance pay and unemployment beneﬁts
and the analysis emphasises the optimal ﬁnancing of beneﬁts by means of layoﬀ taxes.
Common to all these papers is the result that, in a dynamic context, moral hazard
implies that eﬃcient and/or optimal insurance by means of unemployment beneﬁts is
imperfect and job loss costly. This paper shows that severance pay complements unem-
ployment insurance and derives a lower bound for the optimal severance payment as a
function of unemployment duration and beneﬁts. It shows that costly job loss calls for
positive severance pay. The same insight underpinning Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) also
implies that severance payments are not a perfect substitute for unemployment beneﬁts
either. We show that productive eﬃciency still requires the latter to be positive.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic environment.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium of the renegotiation game and derives the agents’ Bell-
man equation. Section 4 characterises the optimal contract. Section 5 calibrates the
model and derives empirical implications. Section 6 considers some extensions and Sec-
tion 7 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.1.
2 Environment
2.1 Description
Time is continuous and the horizon inﬁnite. The economy is composed by an endogenous
number of risk-neutral establishments (or ﬁrms) and a unit mass of risk-averse work-
ers with inﬁnite lifetimes. Workers are endowed with an indivisible unit of labour and






where E is the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t, φ is
the subjective discount rate, cs is consumption at time s and u(.) is the increasing and
strictly concave felicity function.
There are no insurance markets, but agents can self-insure by investing in the only,
riskless, asset available. Therefore, workers’ maximisation problem is subject to the
dynamic budget identity
dat = (rat + zt − ct)dt, (2)
where r is the exogenous riskless rate, at the stock of wealth and zt is the net-of-tax
ﬂow of non-capital income. Disposable non-capital income zt equals the wage wt for an
employed worker and the unemployment beneﬁt b for an unemployed one. Borrowing is
subject to a solvency constraint which will be speciﬁed case-by-case.
In what follows it assumed r = φ. Hence, if markets were complete, workers would
choose a ﬂat consumption proﬁle.
Firms maximize the expected present value of proﬁts discounted at the market interest
rate. Each establishment requires one worker in order to produce. Because of search
frictions, it takes time for a ﬁrm with a vacant position to ﬁnd a worker. Such frictions are
captured by a constant returns to scale, strictly concave, matching technology M(Ut,Vt),
where Ut is the number of unemployed workers and Vt the number of vacancies. With
constant returns instantaneous matching rates depend only on market tightness θt =
Vt/Ut. Contact rates are denoted q(θt) = M(Ut,Vt)/Vt, for vacant ﬁrms, and p(θt) =
M(Ut,Vt)/Ut, for unemployed workers.
Keeping an open vacancy entails a ﬂow cost m > 0. If a ﬁrm and worker meet and
form a match, they negotiate an initial contract. At time t0, when the contract is signed,
the worker starts producing a unit ﬂow of output. At any time t > t0, the job may be
hit by a shock with instantaneous probability λ and the parties decide, after observing
the productivity realization, whether to continue or end the match and on which terms.
7Following a shock the match-speciﬁc value of productivity takes a new value4 y, with y
distributed according to a time-invariant, continuous cumulative density function G(y)
with support Y = [yl,1].
A worker who becomes unemployed receives a net-of-tax ﬂow of unemployment ben-
eﬁts b independently from the reason for separation. We assume b < 1 to ensure a non-
degenerate equilibrium with positive employment exists. As in Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999), beneﬁts are assumed to be ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax τ. The unemployment
beneﬁt fund is balanced at all times.
The paper focuses on simple, realistic employment contracts featuring state-indepen-
dent wages and termination pay. Namely, we assume that a long-term, initial contract
σ = (w,F) only speciﬁes a, post-tax, wage w in case production takes place and a layoﬀ
payment F from the ﬁrm to the worker in case of layoﬀ5.
Crucially it is assumed that termination payments can be conditioned on who takes
veriﬁable steps to end the relationship. A separation is deemed a dismissal if and only
if the ﬁrm gives the worker written notice that it no longer wishes to continue the em-
ployment relationship. The end of the relationship is deemed a quit if the worker gives
written notice that she no longer intends to continue in employment6. That is, neither
party can claim the counterpart has unilaterally severed the relationship unless they can
produce a written document, signed by the other party, proving their claim. This seems
broadly consistent with existing practices in most countries. A separation is consensual
if both parties sign a written document stating their agreement to terminate the rela-
tionship and exchange any termination payment speciﬁed in the document. Until one of
these actions is taken the employment relationship is considered in existence.
At any time the parties can renegotiate the terms of the current contract (w,F). This
ensures that mutual gains which are not exhausted by the ex ante contract can be reaped
ex post. If the initial contract is renegotiated, there are two possibilities. Either the
contract wage is renegotiated and the match continues or the parties agree to renegotiate
4The assumption that new jobs are created at the top of the productivity distribution is without loss
of generality. What matters is that a new match has positive surplus.
5This is broadly consistent with the form of observed labour contracts. Proposition 5 shows that even
such a simple contract delivers full insurance in the benchmark economy.
6Alternatively, not showing up for work without providing a medical certiﬁcate could be interpreted
as a signal that the worker has quit.
8the severance payment and separate.
We allow for the possibility that the government mandates a minimum layoﬀ payment
Fm. Such a minimum standard imposes a constraint F ≥ Fm on the contracted layoﬀ
payment F, since a contract in breach of existing legislation would not be upheld in court.
Although the mandated minimum constraints ex ante contracting, it does not prevent
a ﬁrm-worker pair from negotiating a lower spot side payment upon separation if doing
so is Pareto optimal. The parties can achieve this in two equivalent ways. They can
label the separation a quit or a voluntary redundancy rather than a layoﬀ, in which case
transfers between them are unconstrained by legislation. Alternatively, they can label
the separation a layoﬀ with the worker rebating to the ﬁrm, on the spot, the diﬀerence
between the legislated payment F and the ex post Pareto optimal one.
We restrict attention to stationary equilibria and drop time indices in what follows.
3 Contracts and renegotiation
In order to solve for the optimal contract, one has to work backwards from the moment
a contract is already in place.
In what follows we denote by W u(a) the lifetime expected utility of a worker entering
unemployment as a function of her stock of assets a. W u is assumed continuous and
increasing, as it is indeed the case in equilibrium.
3.1 Contract renegotiation
After the parties match and a contract is signed at time t0, the parties play an inﬁnite
horizon renegotiation game along the lines of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). The game
is illustrated in Figure 1.
The ﬁrst oﬀer of renegotiation is made at t0 and subsequent oﬀers follow at intervals
of ﬁnite length ∆. Let Ωw,ΩF ⊂ R denote respectively the set of possible wage and
severance-pay oﬀers and S = Y × Ωw × ΩF × R the state space. The two sets Ωw,ΩF
are assumed to be continuous and bounded. There is a potentially an inﬁnite number of
bargaining rounds, each of them characterized by the following sequence of moves.
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Figure 1: Renegotiation game
(n.1) Given the current state s = (y,w,F,a) ∈ S, the worker chooses one of the following
two types of action: 1) proposing to produce at a wage wn ∈ Ωw; 2) proposing to
separate with a side payment Fn ∈ ΩF.
(n.2) Given the state and the worker’s choice of action, the ﬁrm chooses among the
following three actions: 1) laying the worker oﬀ; 2) accepting the worker’s proposal;
3) rejecting the worker’s proposal.
If it lays oﬀ the worker the game ends and the ﬁrm has to pay the contractual
severance payment7. Its payoﬀ is −F and the worker’s is W u(a + F).
If Fn is proposed at n.1 and the ﬁrm accepts, the game ends and the ﬁrm and
worker obtain respectively payoﬀs −Fn and W u (a + Fn).
If wn has been proposed at n.1 and the ﬁrm accepts, the wage component of the
contract transits to w′ = wn. If instead the ﬁrm rejects either a wage or a severance
pay proposal, the contract is unchanged and w′ = w. Trade takes place in the current
round at the prevailing contract wage w′ for a time interval of length of time ∆,
generating instantaneous income ﬂows (y − w′) and w′ for the ﬁrm and worker
respectively. The worker chooses her optimal consumption level ˆ ct(y,w′,F,a). At
the end of ∆, the game moves to n.3.
(n.3) With probability λ∆ a new realization ˜ y is drawn from [yl,1] and the match pro-
7Since the initial contract satisﬁes any legislated lower bound by assumption, it is a suﬃcient statistics
for the severance payment in case of unilateral layoﬀ.
10ductivity transits to y′ = ˜ y. With probability 1−λ∆ the match productivity is un-
changed; i.e. y′ = y. The game moves to stage n+1.1 characterized by (y′,w′,F,a′),
with a′ = a + (ra + w′ − ˆ ct)∆.
This extensive form is meant to capture the following three aspects. First, the insight
of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) that if trade takes place over time, rather than at a
ﬁxed date, simple ﬁxed-price contracts are not necessarily renegotiated. If trade under
the terms of the current contract is proﬁtable for both parties, refusing to revise the
contract is a credible threat for the party who opposes renegotiation. This is captured by
the fact that trade takes place at the current contract wage unless the match ends or the
contract is renegotiated8. Second, the threat to refuse renegotiation is constrained by a
party’s option to unilaterally end the match. The threat to end the match, when credible,
limits a ﬁxed-price contract ability to provide insurance against productivity ﬂuctuations
in case the match continues. Third, the parties can renegotiate existing arrangement
when this is Pareto optimal.
The renegotiation game above is a stochastic bargaining game. Merlo and Wilson
(1995) derive a suﬃcient condition for a stochastic, alternating oﬀer bargaining game
to have unique stationary equilibrium payoﬀs. Such condition is violated if agents are
risk-averse. Removing the alternating oﬀer assumption, by giving the worker all the
bargaining power, is suﬃcient to guarantee uniqueness of payoﬀs9.
The equilibrium concept used is stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSP) in
pure strategies. A strategy proﬁle (a payoﬀ proﬁle) is pair of strategies (payoﬀs), one for
each player. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle such that no player can
beneﬁt from deviating from her strategy at any stage. A strategy proﬁle is stationary if
it depends only on the current state and oﬀer. A strategy proﬁle is SSP if it is stationary
and subgame perfect. It follows that a SSP payoﬀ proﬁle is also stationary.
We now show that SSP payoﬀs can be characterized in terms of the solution to a
8It would be straightforward to allow the parties to choose optimally whether to trade or not at the
prevailing wage in case the match survives. If lockouts are illegal and the current contract wage exceeds
the disutility of labour (zero in this case) trade always takes place if the match survives. Lockouts
are indeed illegal in a number of countries. Furthermore, if legal lockouts destroyed insurance with
positive probability by allowing the ﬁrm to renegotiate the contract, the parties could negotiate a Pareto
improving clause ruling them out.
9As it turns out, Proposition 5 shows that giving all bargaining power to the worker is without loss of
generality in the absence of government intervention as payoﬀs are always determined by outside options.
11recursive optimization problem. Let β = 1 − r∆ denote the discount factor over a time
interval ∆ and let E denote the expectation operator over the future realization of y′
conditional on its current value y; i.e. given a generic function h(y′) it is Eh(y′) =
(1 − λ∆)h(y) + λ∆
 
h(˜ y)dG(˜ y). Consider the following optimization problem with time
evolving in discrete intervals of length ∆.
W
e(y,w,F,a) = max
j∈{0,1}, ˆ F, ˆ w
[(1 − j)W
u(a + ˆ F) + jW
t(y, ˆ w,F,a)] (3)
s.t. − (1 − j) ˆ F + jJ




















e(y,w,F,a) = −(1 − j) ˆ F + jJ
t(y, ˆ w,F,a). (8)
Equations (5)-(6) characterize the worker’s value function W t conditional on trade
taking place in the current period. It equals the ﬂow of utility from trading at the
prevailing contract wage w plus the expectation of the continuation payoﬀ W e at the
beginning of the next period. Correspondingly, equation (7) characterizes the ﬁrm value
function Jt with the caveat that the relevant wage for the ﬁrm is the pre-tax wage w+τ.
In terms of the renegotiation game in Figure 1, W t and Jt are the respective payoﬀs at
stage n.2 conditionally on trade taking place at the prevailing wage. The contract (w,F)
is unchanged between the moment trade takes place and the beginning of the next period.
Consider now the worker’s optimization problem after the current productivity is
drawn; i.e. at stage n.1 in Figure 1. The problem is characterized by equations (3)-(4).
The worker can either propose to separate - j = 0 - with some side payment ˆ F or to trade
- j = 1 - at some wage ˆ w. If the worker’s proposal to separate is accepted the worker
enters unemployment with wealth a + ˆ F and payoﬀ W u(a + ˆ F). If the worker’s proposal
12of some wage ˆ w is accepted, ˆ w becomes the current contract wage at which trade takes
place in the current round. The associated worker’s payoﬀ is W t(y, ˆ w,F,a).
Equation (3) assumes that a worker’s proposal is accepted. This is the case if con-
straint (4), which requires that a proposal gives the ﬁrm its reservation payoﬀ, is sat-
isﬁed. The right hand side of equation (4) is the ﬁrm reservation payoﬀ. The ﬁrm
can secure a payoﬀ of −F by paying the contractual severance payment and unilat-
erally ﬁring the worker. Alternatively, it can obtain a payoﬀ Jt(y,w,F,a) by reject-
ing whatever worker’s proposal, in which case trade takes place in the current round
at the unchanged contract wage w. Therefore, if the worker proposes to separate -
j = 0 - the associated ﬁrm payoﬀ − ˆ F must satisfy − ˆ F ≥ max{−F,Jt(y,w,F,a)}. If
the worker proposes to trade - j = 1 - the associated wage ˆ w must give the ﬁrm a payoﬀ
Jt(y, ˆ w,F,a) ≥ max{−F,Jt(y,w,F,a)}. Equation (8) follows.
The following proposition establishes the equivalence between the value functions that
solve the optimization problem (3)-(8) and the SSP payoﬀs of the renegotiation game.
Proposition 1. Let s and ∆ be given. A pair of functions W e(s),Je(s) is a SSP payoﬀ
proﬁle for the renegotiation game if and only if it satisﬁes the system (3)-(8) with (4)
holding as an equality.
The worker extracts all the surplus from the ﬁrm, as one would expect given that she
is the only proposer.
The proposition also implies that a SSP strategy proﬁle induces a stationary payoﬀ
proﬁle which satisﬁes (3)-(8). Therefore, an equilibrium proﬁle also induces a triplet of
functions ( ˆ w(s), ˆ F(s),j(s)) which, given the state, prescribes the outcome - trade, and at
which contract wage, or separate, and with which severance payment - supporting such
payoﬀs. We call such a triplet a SSP outcome.
We can now prove that the equilibrium outcome and payoﬀs are unique.
Proposition 2. Given s and ∆, the renegotiation game has a unique SSP outcome and
payoﬀ proﬁle.
Finally, the following proposition characterizes the solution to system (3)-(8) in the
limit as bargaining frictions become negligible.
13Proposition 3. Let s be given. As the interval between oﬀers goes to zero (∆ → 0), the
unique SSP payoﬀ proﬁle and outcome converge to
J
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and ˆ F(s) = −Je(y,w,F), ˆ w(s) = min{w, ¯ w(y,F)},






The system of equations (9)-(11) is just the continuous-time limit, and compacted,
counterpart of the corresponding system (3)-(8). The latter system is recursive with
equations (7) and (8) alone determining the function Je. Since neither equation contains
worker’s wealth a, Je is independent of a. Equation (9) obtains from equations (7) and (8)
and just restates that in the unique equilibrium the ﬁrm receives its reservation payoﬀ.
It follows that if the match continues the equilibrium wage ˆ w equals the lower between
the current contract wage w and the ﬁrm’s reservation wage ¯ w(y,F) in equation (12).
This is the wage that equates the two terms inside the maximum operator in equation
(9). The associated value W t( ˆ w,F,a) for the worker’s value function, in equation (10),
is the expected utility from continuing the match at the new equilibrium contract wage
ˆ w(s).
Similar reasoning applies to the determination of equilibrium severance payment ˆ F(s).
Equation (10) characterizes the, Pareto optimal, separation decision given ˆ F and ˆ w.
Finally, equation (11) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the worker’s value
function in case trade takes place with W t
a denoting the partial derivative of W t with
respect to wealth a. Note that since shocks are i.i.d., the ﬁrm’s productivity realization
aﬀects the worker’s expected utility W t conditional on the match surviving only through
14w
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Figure 2: Renegotiation and separation
the wage.
It is worth pointing out that the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3 implies no
delay. Trade takes place in all periods as long as the match survives and the parties
immediately agree to separate whenever it is Pareto optimal.
Equation (12) can be inverted to solve for the ﬁrm’s reservation productivity ¯ y(σ) as
a function of the current contract; i.e.






For given F, ¯ y(σ) is an increasing and concave function of w. The corresponding curve is
drawn in Figure 2.
Consider now the joint reservation productivity yd below which the match is destroyed.
This is the value of y which equates W u(a + ˆ F) and W t( ˆ w,F,a) in equation (10) - the
worker’s utility from separation at the equilibrium severance pay and from continuation
at the equilibrium wage. Proposition 3 implies that the joint reservation productivity is
a function yd(σ,a) of the ruling contract σ and the worker’s stock of wealth.
Figure 2 draws yd(σ,a) as a function of w, for given (F,a). To understand how the
two curves intersect consider the following thought experiment. For w large enough it is
ˆ w(s) = ¯ w(y,F) for any y, as the ﬁrm’s outside option is binding - Je(y,σ) = −F - and
the contract wage is renegotiated for any possible productivity realization. Therefore,
the worker’s expected utility from continuing the match W t( ˆ w,F,a) in equation (10)
15is independent of w. For the same reason, also the worker’s return from separation in
equation (10) is independent of w. It follows that yd is also independent of w and strictly
smaller than ¯ y. Reducing w has no eﬀect on yd, but reduces ¯ y. Therefore there exists a
unique critical value w∗(F,a) of w at which the two curves cross.
Given (F,a), the two curves partition the set of possible (y,w) pairs into the four,
mutually exclusive, subsets in Figure 2. Together with (F,a) the contract wage w de-
termines the equilibrium outcome given the productivity realization. In particular, the
triplet (w,F,a) determines whether yd < ¯ y or not.
Consider, for example, the case in which w < w∗(F,a); e.g. w = w1 in Figure 2.
This implies yd(w1,F,a) > ¯ y(w1,F). The value of the productivity realization along the
vertical line through w1 determines the outcome. If y < ¯ y(w1,F), the ﬁrm reservation
payoﬀ coincides with the return to ﬁring the worker at the contractual cost F. If instead
y ≥ ¯ y(w1,F), the ﬁrm prefers continuing to trade at w1. Since yd(w1,F,a) > ¯ y(w1,F)
the contract wage is never renegotiated. Trade takes place at w for any y ≥ yd(w1,F,a),
the parties agree to renegotiate F down and separate if ¯ y(w1,F) < y < yd(w1,F,a) and
the parties separate with a severance payment F if y ≤ ¯ y(w1,F).
Suppose, instead, w > w∗(F,a); e.g. w = w2
c in Figure 2. Unless w is not renegotiated,
the ﬁrm is better oﬀ paying F and ﬁring the worker whenever y < ¯ y(w2,F). Since
¯ y(w2,F,a) > yd(w2,F), the contractual severance payment F is never renegotiated, but
the wage is renegotiated down to ¯ w(y,F) - the inverse image of ¯ y along the segment AB
- whenever yd(w2,F,a) < y < ¯ y(w2,F).
The contract (w,F) is never renegotiated and the transfers it establishes ex ante are
realized ex post in all states if and only if w = w∗
c(F,a).
We summarize the two possible set of outcomes in the following remark.
Remark 1. Given (σ,a) one of two possible cases applies.
a. It is yd(σ,a) ≥ ¯ y(σ) and 1) trade takes place at the ruling wage w in the current
round if y ≥ yd; 2) the parties agree to renegotiate F down to ˆ F = −Je (y,σ) and
separate if ¯ y < y < yd; 3) the parties agree to separate with a severance payment F





16b. It is yd(σ,a) < ¯ y(σ) and 1) trade takes place at the ruling wage w in the current
round if y ≥ ¯ y; 2) the parties agree to renegotiate w down to ¯ w(y,F) and trade in
the current round if yd ≤ y < ¯ y; 3) the parties agree to separate with a severance
payment F if y < yd; 4) yd satisﬁes
W
t( ¯ w(yd,F),F,a) = W
u(a + F). (15)
The remark applies independently from whether the severance payment F born by
the ﬁrm is embodied in a private contract or mandated by legislation as renegotiating F
involves just exchanging a lower spot payment and labelling the separation either a quit
or a voluntary redundancy.
3.2 Initial contract
A Pareto optimal initial contract maximises the present value of the ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁts at t0 subject to the worker receiving a given level of utility. Alternative (eﬃcient)
bargaining solutions just select diﬀerent values for the worker’s utility level. Among
these, the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution is the most used in the matching literature.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to adapt the proof of Proposition 2.4 in Rudanko (2006)
to show that, in the environment of Section 4, the random matching equilibrium with
Nash bargaining coincides with the competitive search equilibrium if Hosios’s (1990)
condition, requiring workers’ Nash bargain share to coincide with the elasticity of the
probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, is satisﬁed.
We therefore assume without much loss of generality that the initial contract satisﬁes
the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution, or









e (1,σ,a) ≥ W
u(a)
J
e (1,σ) ≥ 0
F ≥ Fm.
17The ﬁrst two constraints are the participation constraints for the worker and ﬁrm
respectively. The third one is the institutional constraint on the privately contracted sev-
erance payment F which applies in case the government mandates a minimum severance
payment Fm.
The maximisation problem in equation (16) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in σ on
the interior of the feasible set. This, together with the fact that the Nash maximand is
zero if either participation constraint is binding, implies that a privately optimal contract







and satisfy the surplus sharing condition
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The following Lemma ensures that the two conditions are also suﬃcient for a unique
global maximum.
Lemma 1. Given worker’s wealth, the Nash bargaining programme has a unique local
and global maximum.
Uniqueness of the mapping from workers’ wealth to the optimal contract is necessary
for equilibrium analysis, to which we now turn.
4 Equilibrium with CARA preferences
4.1 Steady state
We can now characterize market returns. To streamline notation we anticipate here that
if workers’ have CARA preferences both the ex ante optimal contract σ∗ and the joint
reservation productivity yd are independent of the worker’s stock of wealth a.
The asset value of an unﬁlled job Vc satisﬁes the Bellman equation
rVc = −m + q (θ)max{J
e(1,σ
∗) − Vc,0} = 0, (19)
18where Je(1,σ∗) is the value to the ﬁrm of forming a new productive match with initial
productivity equal to one and optimal contract σ∗. The second equality follows from free
entry.












The ﬂow equivalent of being unemployed with wealth a equals the ﬂow of utility from
current consumption plus the expected capital gain. The latter has two components.
First, the value of unemployment changes because the stock of wealth changes. The
associated gain equals the change in wealth ra + b − cu times the marginal utility of
wealth W u
a (a), where W u
a denotes the partial derivative of W u(a) with respect to wealth.
Second, the worker meets a ﬁrm at rate p(θ). If she accepts to form a match with a
contract σ∗, her lifetime expected utility is W e(1,σ∗,a).
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the unemployment steady-state ﬂow equilib-
rium condition is
λG(yd)(1 − u) = p(θ)u. (21)
Finally, balancing of the government budget requires the total gross unemployment
beneﬁt bill to equal total tax revenues, or
τ = (b + τ)u. (22)
In order to determine the ﬁrm and worker’s expected returns from matching, J(1,σ∗)
and W e (a,1,σ∗), we need to solve for the optimal contract.
The equilibrium can be formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition (Stationary equilibrium). Assume CARA preferences and no borrowing con-
straints. A stationary equilibrium is a set of policy functions {ct,cu, ¯ y,yd}, value functions
{W e,W t,W u,Je,Vc}, an optimal contract σ∗, market tightness θ, unemployment rate u
and tax τ such that: 1) ct and cu maximise (11) and (20); 2) ¯ y satisﬁes (13) and yd
satisﬁes either (14) or (15); 3) {W e,W t,Je} satisfy (9)-(12); 4) W u satisﬁes (20); 5)
19free entry implies Vc = 0 and Je(1,σ∗) = m/q(θ); 6) σ∗ satisﬁes (16); 7) u is given by
(21); 8) τ satisﬁes (22).
In what follows we specialise the felicity function to the CARA form
u(ct) = −exp{−αct} and impose solvency by means of a no-Ponzi game condition10.
The two assumptions imply that there is no lower bound on workers’ stock of wealth
and that the workers’ attitude towards lotteries over non-capital income is independent
of wealth. Together they make the problem tractable as the following proposition high-
lights.
Proposition 4. Assume CARA preferences and no borrowing constraints. Given i = u,t






2. the saving functions si, the optimal contract σ∗ and the joint reservation productivity
yd are independent of wealth.
The dynamic constraint implies ci = ra+wi−si. Since si is independent of wealth, the
latter enters the worker’s value functions only through the multiplicative term exp{−α(ra)}
which is independent of employment status. Therefore, workers’ wealth does not aﬀect
the maximand of the Nash product in (16) and the separation rules (14) and (15). It
follows that all jobs have the same optimal contract and separation rule11.
Finally, we can characterise the optimal contract.
Proposition 5. Assume CARA preferences and no borrowing constraints. If Fm = −∞,
the optimal contract σ∗is never renegotiated and implies ct(σ∗,a) = cu(a+F) and st(σ∗) =
0.
With CARA preferences and no legislated severance pay, an optimal contract is never
renegotiated and provides full insurance against job loss. As discussed in Section 6.4, the
10This requires debt to grow at a rate below the interest rate, limt→∞(1+r)−tat ≥ 0, with probability
one.
11If this were not the case, contracts and the joint reservation productivity yd would be indexed by
wealth and the whole wealth distribution would be a state variable.
20full insurance result is actually knife-edged and speciﬁc to CARA preferences. Since such
preferences imply that instantaneous utility is proportional to its ﬁrst derivative, it follows
from Proposition 4 that equalising the marginal utility of a worker employed at wage w
and that of a job loser receiving F equates their value functions and implies that the
worker never renegotiates either component of the contract since she is indiﬀerent between
being ﬁred and being employed at the original wage. More importantly, Proposition 5
implies the following corollary which provides a lower bound for the optimal severance
payment.
Corollary 1. The privately optimal F is zero if and only if γ = 0 and exceeds
F = (w − b)/[r + p(θ)] if γ > 0.
Insurance against job loss requires a positive severance payment whenever employed
workers enjoy rents over their unemployed counterparts. The optimal size of severance
pay is bounded below by F, the expected loss in lifetime income associated with transiting
through unemployment. This equals the expected present value of the income loss w −b
over the expected length of an unemployment spell.
The intuition is the following. Proposition 5 implies that consumption does not fall
upon entering unemployment. Since the duration of unemployment is uncertain, the
variability of future consumption for a job loser is higher than for her employed counter-
part. The existence of a precautionary saving motive implies that, for consumption not
to fall upon losing one’s job, the permanent income of a job loser has to exceed that of
an employed worker.
If employed workers enjoy no rents over their unemployed counterparts, their partic-
ipation constraint is binding, and a contract featuring w = b and no severance payment
provides full insurance. Only in such case, the optimal severance payment coincides with
its lower bound F and the latter equals zero.
Clearly, mandated employment protection matters only in so far as it exceeds privately
optimal levels. In such a case the following proposition applies.
Proposition 6. If Fm is marginally above the privately optimal F, the unique optimal
contract features yd > ¯ y.
21Proposition 6 implies that if somebody, e.g. the government, imposes on the parties a
severance payment in excess of the unconstrained privately optimal one then the parties
adjust (reduce) wages in such a way that point a. of Remark 1 applies for y ≥ ¯ y.
The wage component of the contract w is never renegotiated, while the parties agree
to renegotiate the mandated severance payment down to −Je (y,σ) > 0 for y ∈ (¯ y,yd).
Excessive mandated intervention, overinsures job losers and calls for a fall in wages to
reestablish ex ante shares. Furthermore, the ability of the government to impose higher
than laissez-faire job security is limited by renegotiation.
5 Quantitative implications
5.1 Actual versus optimal severance pay
Corollary 1 summarises the main message of the paper: when labour reallocation is a
time-consuming process, severance payments are a necessary part of an optimal insurance
contract whenever employed workers enjoy rents over their unemployed counterparts.
A key prediction of the model is the functional relationship between the lower bound
F on the optimal severance pay on the one hand and wages, beneﬁts and unemployment
duration on the other. Severance payments are usually expressed as a function of the
last wage. For this reason it is useful to deﬁne the variable f = F/w which measures the
severance payment in units of per-period wage. The fact that in reality unemployment
beneﬁts b are a function ρw of the last wage imply that in laissez-faire equilibrium it is
f = (1 − ρ)/(r + p(θ)), (24)
where ρ is the replacement rate.
Equation (24) implies that, as a share of wages, the lower bound on the optimal
severance payment is fully determined by just three variables, the unemployment beneﬁt
replacement rate, the interest rate and unemployment duration. This implies that f is
an increasing function of all exogenous factors which increase equilibrium unemployment
duration such as training and search costs, workers’ bargaining power and frictions in the
matching process.
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Figure 3: f versus actual severance payments
In expressing the lower bound on optimal severance pay as a function of observable
quantities, equation (24) provides an operational metric which can usefully inform the
debate on whether observed legislated job security measures are excessive.
To this eﬀect, we choose an annual interest rate of 4 per cent and use data on un-
employment duration and beneﬁt replacement rates 12 for seventeen OECD countries to
construct a series for f. The data with details of their sources are reported in Table 5
in Appendix A.2. For comparison, we have also constructed series for actual legislated
dismissal payments and notice periods for blue and white collar workers assuming a rep-
resentative worker with job tenure equal to the average completed job tenure derived
from the worker-ﬂow data in Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2002). The resulting
four series are reported in Table 5 in Appendix A.2. Since in a number of countries no-
tice periods constitute the main bulk of dismissal costs for ﬁrms, our series for observed
legislated severance payments add up dismissal payments and notice periods. The result
are two series for legislated severance payments for white and blue collar workers.
12The lower bound f should be a function of unemployment duration in the counterfactual laissez-faire
equilibrium which is unobservable. Yet, as shown in Section 5.2, the distinction is not quantitatively
important.
23Figure 1 plots the lower bound f on the horizontal axis against the two series for
legislated severance payment for a worker of average tenure. In interpreting Figure 1 it
is worth keeping in mind, that not only is f a lower bound, but our series for legislated
payments constitute an upper bound for actual legislated dismissal payment to the extent
that the actual cost to ﬁrms of notice requirements falls short of total wage payments
over the mandated notice period in so far as workers ﬁnd a new job before the expiration
of their notice. Hence, if legislated severance payments were in line with optimal private
arrangements one should observe most data points to lie above the forty-ﬁve degree line.
The ﬁgure highlights that, for a number of countries, legislated payments are sig-
niﬁcantly below the level consistent with optimal insurance. In particular, legislated
severance payments for all workers in Ireland and for blue collar workers in Belgium
are signiﬁcantly below their optimal level. Given the high duration of unemployment
in these two countries over the sample period, legislated payments underinsure workers.
The same is also true for France and New Zealand. Spain and Italy, two countries which
are normally deemed to have extreme levels of employment protection, turn out to have
legislated payments which exceed their optimal lower bound by respectively one and at
most six months. This is not so surprising in the light of an average unemployment du-
ration in excess of thirty months for Italy and forty months for Spain. The two starred
observations for Italy refer to the period before 1991, the year in which the replacement
rate was raised from three to forty per cent. They make clear the extent to which de-
spite the very high levels of dismissal costs Italian workers were underinsured before the
reform.
Portugal presents the most extreme case. The mandated level of severance payments
exceeds its optimal lower bound by slightly more than eleven months. With eﬀectively
the same replacement rate but an unemployment duration roughly one third of the Span-
ish one, its optimal severance payment should also be roughly one third. Yet, observed
legislated payment in Portugal are higher than in Spain. Also severance payments for
white collar workers in Belgium exceed their optimal lower bound by eleven months. It
is worth keeping in mind, though, that in the latter case, as for countries such as Den-
mark and Sweden, notice periods constitute the bulk of the legislated severance payment
24reported in the ﬁgure13. Hence, the actual cost to ﬁrms and transfer to workers is likely
to be lower.
The above discussion makes clear that if one judges legislated employment protection
measures by how much insurance against the cost of job loss they imply then, with the
possible exception of Portugal, there is little support for the view that Mediterranean
countries, or indeed most OECD countries, feature levels of employment protections sig-
niﬁcantly in excess of privately optimal levels. There is an important caveat, though.
Since our series for optimal severance payments has been constructed using observed un-
employment duration the above comparison does not allow for the widely-debated possi-
bility that the positive relationship between legislated employment protection measures
and unemployment duration reﬂects the reverse causation going from high mandated job
security to low job creation. We tackle this possibility in the next subsection.
5.2 Quantitative impact of excessive mandated job security.
We have been able to characterise the features of an optimal contract and obtain in-
sight into the rationale for the existence of severance payments in an eﬀectively partial
equilibrium set up. Yet, the question of the allocational and welfare impact of excessive
mandated job security is of an equilibrium nature and, given the model complexity, can
only be answered numerically.
To this eﬀect we calibrate our model economy to the Portuguese one. As noted in
Section 5.1 Portugal is characterised by legislated dismissal costs dramatically in excess
of the optimal lower bound predicted by the model. It is also one of the countries where
severance pay constitutes the main bulk of dismissal costs. Therefore, it appears a natural
benchmark to investigate the consequences of excessive government intervention.
We choose a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(U,V ) = AUηV 1−η, where A indexes
the eﬃciency of the matching process. The productivity distribution is assumed uniform
on [yl,1]. With beneﬁts equal to b = ρw where ρ is the replacement ratio, the model has
ten parameters: {r,yl,ρ,α,η,λ,γ,fc,m,A}.
All ﬂow variables are per quarter. The interest rate is r = φ = 0.01. The lower support
13See the table in section A.2.
25Table 1: Summary of calibration
Portugal Model
Moments
Unemployment rate (%) 6.5 6.5
Avg. unemployment duration (months) 17 17
Parameters
G(y) uniform on [yl,1], m(U,V ) = AUηV 1−η, u(c) = exp{−αc}.
r = .01, γ = η = .5, ρ = .65, fc = 17, m = 10, λ = .014, yl = .32, A = 0.18, α = 1.7.
of the distribution is set to yl = 0.32 to obtain a coeﬃcient of variation for output shocks
of 0.3 as in Blanchard and Portugal (2000). The Portuguese beneﬁt replacement rate is
ρ = 0.65. The ratio between the legislated severance pay and the net quarterly wage is
set to 5.7 which corresponds to its value of 17 months in Table 514. The chosen value for
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is α = 1.7 which implies a coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion of σ = αcu(0) = 1.5 for an unemployed worker with zero wealth. A value of
1.5 is in the middle of the range of available estimates for the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion. Results are reported also for α = 3.5 which corresponds to σ = 3. The elasticity
of the matching function α is set to 0.5 consistently with the evidence in Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). The chosen value for the coeﬃcient of workers’ bargaining power γ is
also 0.5. As noted in Section 3.2 this implies that the bargaining equilibrium coincides
with the competitive search one. If workers are risk neutrals, it also implies that the
decentralised equilibrium is eﬃcient in the absence of unemployment beneﬁts.
The cost of posting a vacancy m is set to 0.33 following Millard and Mortensen
(1997). The remaining two parameters λ and A are set to 0.014 and 0.18 to match
an average unemployment duration of 17 months and an unemployment rate of 6.5 per
cent. The chosen value for unemployment duration comes from the OECD unemployment
duration database15 (see Blanchard and Portugal (2000), ﬁgure 4). Table 1 summarises
the calibration procedure .
14The government budget constraint (22) implies that the tax born by the worker equals the total
beneﬁt bill net of taxes divided by the size of the employment pool. Therefore, it is legitimate to equate
the net wage in the model with the wage net of payroll taxes in the data.
15Bover, Garc´ ıa-Perea and Portugal (2000) calculate a slightly higher value of 20 months for the period
1992-1997 using the Portuguese Labour Force Survey. Despite using the same worker outﬂow data in
their empirical part, Blanchard and Portugal (2000) assume a much lower value of 9 months in their
calibration.
26Table 2: Mandated severance payments (in months of net wages)
σ = 1.5 σ = 3
Laissez-faire Mandated Laissez-faire Mandated
Severance pay 6 17 30 6 17 30
Job ﬁnding rate (%) 17.4 17.8 18.1 17.7 17.8 17.9
Job destruction (%) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.4
Gross wage × 100 93.3 89.4 85.9 93.3 89.4 85.9
Net wage × 100 89.0 85.4 82.1 89.0 85.4 82.1
Net output 100.0 100.2 100.3 100.0 100.1 100.1
Welfare (employed) 100.0 100.0 99.8 100.0 99.9 99.3
Welfare (unemployed) 100.0 99.9 99.6 100.0 99.7 99.1
Welfare (avg. job loser) 100.0 103.4 106.2 100.0 103.2 105.7
We can now tackle the question of the employment and welfare costs of mandated
employment protection. Table 2 summaries our ﬁndings for the benchmark case in which
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals 1.5 and for the more extreme one in which
it equals 3. It shows the allocational and welfare impact of imposing mandated severance
payments of respectively 17 and 30 months, against a privately optimal value of 6 months
in the calibrated economy16. 17 months is the legislated value in Portugal used in our
calibration. 30 months is an upper bound obtained by adding the size of the largest
mandated severance payments in our dataset - 24 months - to the privately optimal
value.
Clearly legislated severance payments below private optima are not binding and have
no eﬀect. Instead, rows three to ten in Table 2 report the labour allocation, wages and
the percentage change, relative to laissez-faire, in the present value of net output, and
workers’ welfare17 associated with the three levels of severance pay considered.
The eﬀect of legislated severance payment widely in excess of private optima on job
destruction is negligible, as the legislated severance payment is renegotiated. As for
the job ﬁnding rate, with σ = 1.5, it increases by 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points when
16This is ﬁve per cent larger than 5.7 months, the value of the optimal lower bound f in our calibration.
17The values of quantities with no meaningful unit of measurement have been normalised to 100 in
the decentralised equilibrium. The present value of output is the shadow value of an unemployed worker
which, as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), is maximised at a social optimum in the risk-neutral case.
Workers’ welfare is measured in terms of the percentage of permanent consumption in the laissez faire
equilibrium which would give worker the same level of utility as in the equilibrium with government
intervention.
27severance payments exceed their laissez-faire value by respectively 11 and 24 months.
The corresponding fall in the unemployment rate is 0.2 and 0.5 of a percent. The fall in
unemployment duration is due to a fall in the gross (producer) wage w + τ equal to 4
and 12 percent respectively.
This fall in unemployment duration may appear surprising at ﬁrst sight. Even if
wages fall in response, government intervention by increasing income uncertainty should
increase the cost to the ﬁrm of providing a given level of utility and reduce, rather than
increase, job creation. A second, oﬀsetting, eﬀect is at play, though. At given beneﬁt
replacement rate, the reduction in wages reduces steady state unemployment beneﬁts and
workers’ threat point in bargaining thus increasing ﬁrms’ return to job creation. If the
beneﬁt replacement rate is suﬃciently high the second eﬀect prevails.
Net (consumer) wages fall slightly less than gross wages due to the fall in the payroll
tax stemming from the fall in unemployment.
The fall in wages, unemployment duration and the unemployment rate is smaller in
the case in which σ = 3. Higher risk aversion implies that workers’ are less willing to
trade oﬀ a wage cut for overinsurance in case of job loss.
Independently from the degree of risk aversion, the increase in unemployment duration
increases net output in our calibration, as unemployment beneﬁts are ineﬃciently high
and, job creation ineﬃciently low, in the calibrated economy. While the sign of the change
in net output is speciﬁc to the choice of calibration parameters, though, its absolute value
is not. In general, the change is very small, reﬂecting the marginal nature of the change
in the allocation.
Turning to welfare, as legislated payments increase, the average job loser’s welfare
increases signiﬁcantly as the increase in the expected severance pay more than oﬀsets the
increased consumption variability. On the other hand, welfare falls for employed workers
and unemployed job seekers. The fall in welfare is no larger than respectively one tenth
(σ = 1.5) and one third (σ = 3) of one per cent for the case in which mandated payments
equal 17 months of wages. If σ = 3 though, the maximum welfare loss is nearly one per
cent when mandated payments equal 30 months.
It is instructive to conduct the same experiment starting from the constrained eﬃcient
equilibrium in which, as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), the social planner chooses one
28Table 3: Mandated severance payments (in months of net wages): eﬃcient beneﬁts
σ = 1.5, ρ = 0.05 σ = 3, ρ = 0.1
Laissez-faire Mandated Laissez-faire Mandated
Severance pay 9.8 21 34 9.6 21 34
Job ﬁnding rate (%) 28.7 28.3 28.1 28.6 28.0 27.5
Job destruction (%) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Unemployment rate (%) 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9
Gross wage × 100 89.4 86.2 83.3 89.5 86.3 83.4
Net wage × 100 89.2 86.0 83.1 89.1 85.9 83.0
Net output† 101.9 101.9 101.9 101.9 101.9 101.9
Welfare (employed)† 100.3 100.2 100.0 100.2 100.1 99.6
Welfare (unemployed)† 99.0 98.9 98.6 99.0 98.8 98.3
Welfare (avg. job loser)† 100.3 103.4 106.1 100.2 103.3 105.8
† Relative to the corresponding value in laissez-faire equilibrium with ρ = 0.65 in Table 2.
instrument, the replacement rate, to maximise net output18.
The results of such experiment are reported in Table 3. Net output and welfare are
reported as proportion of their corresponding value in the laissez-faire equilibrium in
Table 2.
The ﬁrst interesting result is that, as far as eﬃciency is concerned, severance payments
are no perfect substitute for unemployment beneﬁts. The eﬃcient replacement rate is
respectively 0.05 and 0.1 depending on the risk aversion coeﬃcient. The intuition is the
same as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and is clearest in the present CARA setup19,
where given the absence of wealth eﬀects, severance pay have no partial equilibrium ef-
fect on the bargaining outcome. Decreasing marginal utility implies that wages increase a
worker’s surplus by less than they reduce a ﬁrm’s one. Therefore, if Hosios’s (1990) con-
dition is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm’s share of surplus is ineﬃciently high in the absence of beneﬁts.
This result applies as long as workers marginal utility of consumption is decreasing.
Second, the optimal severance payment size is decreasing in the replacement rate.
It is now roughly 10 months of wages against 6 months in Table 2. The larger income
fall, relative to the calibrated benchmark economy, is less than oﬀset by the general
18Unlike in Acemoglu and Shimer’s (1999) benchmark model, the equilibrium considered is only con-
strained eﬃcient as one instrument is insuﬃcient to hit both active margins - job creation and job
destruction. In practice, though, the allocation turns out to coincide with the eﬃcient allocation of the
model with risk-neutral workers to at least the third decimal digit.
19The optimal replacement rate is roughly half than in Table 1 in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) as
their calibration features an average unemployment duration of 6.5 years against 17 months here.
29equilibrium fall in unemployment duration.
Third, increasing severance payments by the same amount as in Table 2 - respectively
11 and 24 months - above their privately optimal value still has hardly any allocational
eﬀect, although the sign of the change in the duration of unemployment and its level is
now reversed relative to Table 2. Given the small replacement rate, the fall in wages has
now a smaller eﬀect on the worker’s threat point relative to the previous case. Therefore
the higher cost of providing a given level of utility to the worker is less than oﬀset by
the fall in her bargaining power. Job creation falls as a consequence, but the absolute
value of the change is still negligible. The associated reduction in net output is less
than second order (lower than a thousandth of a per cent) with respect to the change in
unemployment while the fall in welfare is roughly the same as in Table 2.
Conversely, the eﬃciency cost of raising the replacement rate from its eﬃcient level
to 0.65 is large. Net output in the laissez-faire equilibrium with eﬃcient beneﬁts is 1.9%
higher than in the corresponding equilibrium when ρ = 0.65. As for welfare, the increase
in the replacement rate redistributes from employed, whose net wage falls due to the
increase in the unemployment pool and the payroll tax, to unemployed workers.
Summing up, the robust insight of the paper is that, if ﬁrms and workers can write
optimal contracts, however simple, legislated dismissal costs have very small allocational
eﬀects. The result implies that even in the absence of complete markets there is no causal
relationship from legislated dismissal costs to high unemployment rates and duration and
low job destruction. On the contrary, our ﬁndings imply that the causation goes the
other way round, from factors, such as high workers’ bargaining power, or high matching
frictions, that result in high unemployment duration to optimal severance payments.
Also, the optimal severance payment is larger, the lower the amount of insurance provided
by the state through unemployment beneﬁts.
It is worth emphasising that the comparisons involve alternative steady states. So,
while employed workers would be better oﬀ in the steady state of the laissez faire econ-
omy, they would lose if at a point in time excessive legislated job security measures
were scrapped. Since contract wages are not renegotiated up as long as they remain
above reservation wages in the post-reform equilibrium, employed workers would suﬀer a
negative windfall given that their contract wages were ﬁxed at a lower level in the past,
30reﬂecting higher expected layoﬀ payments. This is consistent with the fact that employed
workers are often very opposed to reduction in mandated job security.
It also has to be pointed out that the size of the welfare losses derived reﬂects two
extreme deviations from laissez faire. Figure 3 shows that for all but two countries in
our dataset the diﬀerence between the lower bound f and legislated severance payments
is 5 months or less, rather than 11 months.
It is obviously of interest to know how sensitive the results are to changes in the
key parameters. It turns out that, for a given diﬀerence between optimal and mandated
severance pay, the result is remarkably robust to alternative parameterisations being
driven by the optimal nature of contracts rather than any other features20.
6 Extensions and discussion
This paper has relied on a number of simplifying assumptions to derive a closed form lower
bound for the optimal severance pay wage ratio as a function of observable quantities. In
what follows we discuss how relaxing such assumptions alters the main conclusions. The
broad message can be anticipated here. The lower bound we have derived is remarkably
robust. Also, provided wages are ﬂexible and separation jointly optimal, the welfare
losses derived in Section 5.2 are an upper bound on the corresponding losses under less
restrictive assumptions.
6.1 Wage rigidity and no renegotiation21
To better understand the near-neutrality result derived in the paper it may be useful
to disentangle the relative role played by wage ﬂexibility and ex post renegotiation of
mandated severance payment.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the contract wage is rigid, but the severance payment
is renegotiated. Standard manipulation of equation (9) allows writing the value of a new
20Calibrating the model to the US economy produces very similar results. They are available upon
request.
21I am grateful to an anonymous referee and Ioana Marinescu for suggesting to explore respectively
the rigid-wage and no-renegotiation cases.
31job as
J(1,σ) =
1 − ¯ y
r + λ
− F, (25)
where ¯ y satisﬁes (13).
It follows that, for given w, the contractual or mandated severance payment F fully
determines the ﬁrm’s return from job creation and, through equation (19), market tight-
ness. An increase in F, at given w, reduces job creation. Importantly, since (19), (13) and
(25) do not depend on workers’ preferences, the result applies to any matching model in
which wages are exogenous.
The last column in Table 4 reports the allocation and welfare associated with increas-
ing F while keeping w constant at its level in the laissez-faire benchmark in Section 5.2
in the case in which the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals 1.5. Increasing F to
17 months eﬀectively exhausts any return to job creation and no equilibrium exists for
higher values of the mandated severance payment. Job creation collapses to a ﬁfth of its
original value as the wage is prevented from reestablishing proﬁtability of new jobs. Given
constant returns in production, mandated severance payments have a large negative im-
pact on the ex ante value of a job. Job destruction fall by 20 per cent as the increase
in duration makes workers less willing to enter unemployment. All welfare measures also
collapse. It follows that the ﬂexibility of the average wage in response to policy parame-
ters is crucial not only for mandated severance pay to have negligible welfare costs, but,
much more generally, for the ability of calibrated matching models to generate reason-
able changes in allocation and welfare in response to observed cross-country variation in
policies.
Let us now turn to the opposite case in which the wage is endogenous, but the excessive
mandated severance payment is not renegotiated. In such a case yd no longer satisﬁes
equation (14), but instead coincides with the ﬁrm’s reservation productivity ¯ y even outside
laissez faire. The wage is instead still determined by equation (18).
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 report the allocational and welfare changes when severance
pay is increased relative to its laissez-faire value. The separation rate falls signiﬁcantly
as there is now (jointly) suboptimal labour hoarding. The producer wage, though, is
eﬀectively unchanged relative to Table 2. In fact, it falls marginally with higher severance
32Table 4: Mandated severance payments (months of wages): σ = 1.5.
Laissez-faire Mandated Mandated
Exog. F Exog. w
Severance pay 5.7 17 30 15
Job ﬁnding rate (%) 17.4 17.7 17.8 2.5
Job destruction (%) 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0
Unemployment rate (%) 6.7 5.7 4.8 28.5
Gross wage × 100 93.3 89.5 86.0 93.3
Net wage × 100 89.0 85.9 83.2 69.2
Net output 100.0 100.1 100.2 54.8
Welfare (employed) 100.0 100.3 99.8 72.8
Welfare (unemployed, fc = 0) 100.0 100.2 99.6 64.4
Welfare (average job loser) 100.0 103.9 107.3 67.9
pay as, given the increase in job duration, a given wage cut implies a bigger fall in a
worker’s permanent income and welfare. It follows that job creation is hardly aﬀected
and the unemployment rate falls signiﬁcantly.
Net output still increases with the fall in unemployment, though marginally less than
in the case in which separation is Pareto optimal. More surprising is the marginal in-
crease in welfare for unemployed and employed workers when F is increased to 17 months
of wages. The increase is fully accounted for by the fall in the lump sum tax, a positive
externality, stemming from the lower unemployment level. Were it not for the tax reduc-
tion, consumption and welfare would actually fall. When F equals 30 months of wages
though, the welfare loss is comparable to the corresponding one in Table 2, with the fall
in taxes still accounting for the diﬀerence. Basically, the larger fall in taxes oﬀsets the
welfare cost associated with the private ineﬃciency of separation.
While less crucial than wage ﬂexibility, the ability of the parties to negotiate Pareto
optimal side payments is an important ingredient of the near-neutrality result, though it
hardly matters for welfare.
There are numerous examples suggesting that negotiation of Pareto optimal transfers
upon separation is more than a theoretical construct. One such instance is the frequency
with which one reads or hears about voluntary redundancy packages and/or early re-
tirement incentives oﬀered by downsizing ﬁrms. By revealed preferences, these must be
jointly optimal (if workers accept them) and if contracting ﬁrms make the eﬀort to nego-
tiate such packages the associated cost must be smaller than the, possibly shadow, cost
33of unilaterally laying workers oﬀ. Also, in Germany ﬁrms cannot legally carry out mass
redundancies (i.e. the mandated layoﬀ cost is inﬁnite) unless they agree with workers’
representatives on a social plan covering procedures and compensation packages. For
Italy, a country usually associated with extreme levels of employment protection, IDS
(2000) reports that employers often negotiate incentive payments to induce employees to
take voluntary redundancy and sign agreements waiving their right to take legal proceed-
ings22. Finally, Toharia and Ojeda (1999) document that it is common for Spanish ﬁrms
to agree with workers to label economic dismissals as disciplinary ones to economise on
advance notice and procedural costs. Between 60 and 70 per cent of all dismissals, over
the 1987-97 period, took this form and involved bargaining over the size of termination
payments.
6.2 Alternative preferences
CARA preferences and no lower bound on consumption, while analytically convenient,
are unappealing for well-known reasons. The following proposition generalises the result
in Proposition 4 to a larger class of preferences.
Proposition 7. If u′′′ > 0, it is ex ante optimal to trade a higher F for a lower w at the
actuarially fair rate as long as cc(1,σ,a) > cu(a + F).
If consumers are prudent, the optimal contract requires that consumption in those
states in which the worker enters unemployment and the severance payment is not rene-
gotiated is no smaller than consumption in those states in which the worker is employed
at the contract wage.
The proof of Proposition 7 assumes φ = r, but the result easily generalises to the case
in which φ > r and marginal utility is not strictly convex as long as a lower bound on
consumption generates a precautionary saving motive23.
A formal proof that the permanent income of a job loser receiving F exceeds the
permanent income of a worker employed at the contract wage is not available for the
22The same source reports a total cost for individual redundancy of 10-12 months of wages for a worker
paid around 2 million ITL a month.
23It is straightforward to adapt the arguments in Aiyagari (1994) to show that, in a stationary equi-
librium with a precautionary saving motive, the saving of a newly matched worker is positive even if
φ > r.
34general case. Yet, the intuition behind Corollary 3 that, given that the contract provides
insurance, the future consumption of an employed worker is less variable than that of a
job loser suggests that the permanent income of the job loser must be higher for cu(a+F)
not to be smaller than cc(1,σ,a).
Allowing for borrowing constraints is also unlikely to signiﬁcantly change the results
in Section 5. A previous version of this paper featuring hand-to-mouth consumers (but
allowing for annuitization of severance payments) obtained similar results with only frac-
tionally larger welfare costs.
6.3 Non-stationary beneﬁts
With CARA preferences, allowing for the, realistic, possibility that workers entitlement to
beneﬁts falls over an unemployment spell or for the kind wage of losses in new occupations
documented for example by Topel (1990) and Farber (2003) would leave unchanged the
functional forms for the value functions and the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal
contract24. Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 would still apply. The fall in lifetime wealth
associated with job loss would be larger though. The associated lower bound on the
optimal severance payment would also be larger than in expression (24), if, as in our
dataset, ρ denotes the replacement rate upon job loss rather than its average25 value over
an unemployment spell and beneﬁts fall over time.
In fact, our argument that the privately optimal size of severance pay is strictly
positive just relies on the average replacement rate being smaller than one. Not only is
the latter the case in practice. The moral hazard associated with the conditional nature
of beneﬁts implies that the maximum, let alone the average, replacement rate along a
socially optimal path is below one even when consumers cannot borrow or lend and the
optimal time proﬁle of beneﬁts is non-stationary, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)
and Coles and Masters (2006).
24Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997) and Rosolia and Saint-Paul (1998) document even larger losses
respectively for France and Spain.
25Where the average replacement rate is deﬁned as the constant rate whose expected present value
over an unemployment spell coincides with the present value of the path of actual replacement rates.
356.4 Imperfect insurance
In the above analysis, the optimal contract is never renegotiated in the laissez-faire equi-
librium and insurance against match productivity shocks is perfect. As noted in Section
4 this is not true in general, though.
Consider, for example, the case in which the utility of leisure is positive. If the
utility function is separable in consumption and leisure the contract curve is unchanged.
Furthermore, it is easily shown that Proposition 4 still applies with the only diﬀerence
that W u > u(cu)/r if the utility of leisure is positive. It follows from Proposition 7 that
under the optimal contract the lifetime utility of being employed at the contract wage is
smaller than that of entering unemployment receiving the contracted severance payment
F. Therefore, the latter must be renegotiated down with positive probability - yd > ¯ y -
and insurance is imperfect.
The same insight is likely to apply if workers have DARA preferences. Provided the
optimal w and F are non-decreasing in wealth26 it can be shown that DARA preferences
imply yd > ¯ y even if leisure yields no utility.
6.5 Alternating oﬀer bargaining
The assumption that workers have all the bargaining power in the renegotiation game
implies that workers capture all the surplus from separation. If instead ﬁrms capture
a positive share of the surplus from separation, the agreed severance payment when F
is renegotiated is lower for given w and y. Hence, the redistribution associated with
excessive job security is smaller. This further reinforces the conclusion that the welfare
loss derived in Section 5.2 is a upper bound.
One may also wonder to which extent the chosen bargaining protocol, which makes
the oﬀer to renegotiate the wage or the severance payment mutually exclusive, aﬀects
the solution. One natural alternative would be for the worker to propose to renegotiate
the whole contract (w,F), when oﬀering to continue the match. The outcome would be
26DARA preferences do imply that the bargained wage is increasing in wealth in the static case. While
the absence of a wealth eﬀect on the bargaining outcome generalises from the static to dynamic case
with CARA preferences, one can only conjecture that, with DARA preferences, the sign of the wealth
eﬀect is preserved in going from the static to the dynamic case.
36diﬀerent, though, only if in equilibrium the ex ante contract were renegotiated for y > yd.
Yet, this is not the case with CARA preferences. Furthermore, we have argued in Section
6.4 that the same is true under a number of alternative assumption, including possibly
DARA utility.
7 Conclusion
This paper characterises ﬁrms’ optimal provision of insurance by means of simple em-
ployment contracts when asset markets are incomplete and searching for a job is a costly
activity. It establishes that positive severance payments are part of an optimal contract
whenever employed workers enjoy positive rents. More importantly, the paper derives a
lower bound on the optimal severance payment as a function of observable quantities.
Such bound equals the fall in lifetime wealth associated with job loss and is therefore
decreasing in unemployment beneﬁt replacement rates and increasing in unemployment
duration.
The paper makes no attempt to explain if and why severance payments should be
enshrined in legislation rather than in written private, explicit contracts. In fact, ﬁrms
have the same incentives to evade both legislated and privately contracted severance
payments and courts face the same informational asymmetries in enforcing both types
of measures. One possible explanation for excessive government intervention, along the
lines of Saint-Paul (2002), is that it reﬂects the ability of a majority of employed insiders
to extract a one-oﬀ welfare gain at the expense of the present and future generations of
unemployed27. Nevertheless, if the assumption is made that observed legislated measures
reﬂect, to some extent, the degree to which private arrangements call for them the model
predicts that there should be a direct relationship, coeteris paribus, between job security
measures and the expected income loss associated with transiting through unemployment.
Indirect evidence consistent with the above assumption comes from Boeri, Borsch-
Supan and Tabellini (2001) who ﬁnd a negative correlation between an index of employ-
ment protection and a measure of beneﬁt coverage. More direct evidence can be obtained
27The outcome is self-sustaining as new generations of insiders, whose contract wage was determined
on the basis of the excessive mandated severance pay, would suﬀer a windfall be hurt by a subsequent
reform which reduced the latter.
37by regressing observed legislated dismissal costs against the expected income cost of job

















2 = 0.24 s.e. = 6.39.
There is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the series for f∗ and
those for legislated dismissal costs for blue and white collar workers fBC and fWC in
Table 5.
In principle, such positive correlation may reﬂect the reverse causation from high
legislated job security to high unemployment duration which has been most emphasised
in the literature on employment protection. Numerical simulations of our model, though,
indicate that such reverse causation is unwarranted despite the lack of perfect insurance.
Furthermore, optimal private contracting undoes the eﬀects of excessive mandate job
security to a great extent.
28Standard errors in parenthesis.
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42A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Lemma 2. Let ΓW = Ωw ∪ ΩF denote the worker’s action set and AW : S → ΓW and
AE : S×ΓW → {accept, layoﬀ, reject} denote respectively a worker’s and ﬁrm stationary
strategy. The set of SSP equilibria can be characterized in terms of a strategy proﬁle
AW(s) =

      
      
Fn = ˆ F(s) if j(s) = 0 and Jt(s) ≥ −F,
wn = ˆ w(s) if j(s) = 1 and ˆ w(s)  = w,
wn ∈ w ∪ Ψw(s)




      
      
accept if ΓW = wn ∈ Ψw(s) or ΓW = Fn ≤ ˆ F(s),
layoﬀ if Jt(s) < −F and
either ΓW = wn / ∈ Ψw(s) or ΓW = Fn > ˆ F(s)
reject otherwise,
(27)
and a payoﬀ proﬁle W e(s),Je(s) with W e(s),Je(s),j(s), ˆ w(s), ˆ F(s) satisfying the system
(3)-(8).
Proof. Note that the system (3)-(4) implies ˆ w(s) ∈ Ψw(s) and − ˆ F(s) = max{−F,Jt(s)}.
The latter follows from W u(a) being continuous and strictly increasing.
Suppose a SSP strategy proﬁle AW,AE exists and be W e(s),Je(s) the associated SSP
payoﬀ proﬁle as of stage n+1.1, where n is arbitrary given stationarity. Let W t(s),Jt(s)
denote the SSP payoﬀs at stage n.2, conditionally on trade taking place at the prevailing
wage. Given W e(s), W t(s) has to satisfy (5)-(6) since otherwise either W t(s) is unattain-
able or the worker can improve upon it by choosing ct(s) optimally. Similarly, given
Je(s), Jt(s) must trivially satisfy (7) as the ﬁrm does not choose any action until the
next round.
Consider the ﬁrm optimal choice of action at n.2. If it rejects a proposal, σ is un-
changed and the ﬁrm payoﬀ is Jt(s). If it lays the worker oﬀ its payoﬀ is −F. If at n.1 the
worker has chosen ΓW = Fn and the ﬁrm accepts its payoﬀ is −Fn. Therefore is optimal
for the ﬁrm to accept any Fn ≤ ˆ F(s) and reject otherwise. If instead at n.1 the worker
43has chosen ΓW = wn and the ﬁrm accepts, the new contract wage is w′ = wn and the
associated ﬁrm payoﬀ is Jt(y,wn,F,a). Therefore, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to accept any
wage oﬀer wn ∈ Ψw(s). When confronted with an oﬀer wn / ∈ Ψw(s) it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to lay the worker oﬀ if −F > Jt(s) and reject and obtain Jt(s) otherwise.
Consider the worker’s optimal choice at stage n.1. Suppose the worker proposes some
severance payment Fn. If the ﬁrm accepts the worker’s payoﬀ is W u(a + Fn). Given the
ﬁrm acceptance strategy, it is optimal for the worker to propose Fn = ˆ F(s) if Jt(s) ≥ −F.
If instead Jt(s) < −F, it is ˆ F(s) = F. The same outcome - separation with a side payment
equal to F - obtains whether the worker proposes Fn = ˆ F(s) or whether she makes an
unacceptable proposal. Conditional on separation being optimal - j = 0 - any such
proposal is optimal. Suppose instead the worker proposes some wage wn. The worker
payoﬀ is W t(y,wn,F,a) if the ﬁrm accepts, W t(s) if it rejects and W u(a+F) if the ﬁrm
lays the worker oﬀ. If ˆ w(s)  = w, optimality requires the worker to propose wn = ˆ w(s).
Alternatively, if ˆ w(s) = w it is Jt(s) ≥ −F and any proposal wn ∈ w∪Ψw(s) or Fn > ˆ F(s)
results in an unchanged contract wage w. Conditional on continuation being optimal -
j = 1 - any such proposal is optimal. In either case, the worker payoﬀ is W t(y, ˆ w(s),F,a).
Finally, it is optimal for the worker to make a proposal which results in separation
with ˆ F(s) if W u(a + ˆ F(s)) > W t(y, ˆ w(s),F,a) or j(s) = 0 in (3) and to propose a wage
which results in a contract wage ˆ w(s) if W u(a + ˆ F(s)) ≤ W t(y, ˆ w(s),F,a) or j(s) = 1 in
(3). It follows that the payoﬀ proﬁle evaluated at n.1 must satisfy (3) and (8).
The proof follows from the above discussion noting that a deviation in a single stage
does not aﬀect continuation payoﬀs in a stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 3. The ﬁrm SSP payoﬀ satisﬁes Je(s) = max{Jt(s),−F}.
Proof. The proof is in two steps.
First, it is Je(s) = minw max{Jt(y,w,F,a),Jt(s),−F} for all s. For all s in which
separation takes place -j(s) = 0 - this follows from Lemma 2 which implies Je(s) = ˆ F(s) =
max{−F,Jt(s)}. Consider instead those s for which the match survives - j(s) = 1. Lemma
2 implies that SSP equilibria induce a Pareto optimal outcome in all s. By deﬁnition and
strict monotonicity of the respective instantaneous utility functions the Pareto frontier
44is strictly decreasing in payoﬀ space. Therefore, an optimal wage oﬀer by the worker
minimizes the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from acceptance subject to the ﬁrm receiving its reservation
payoﬀ max{Jt(s),−F}.
We now prove that Je(s) = max{−F,Jt(s)}. Let H denote the space of bounded con-
tinuous functions on S taking values in R. Je(s) = minw max{Jt(y,w,F,a),Jt(s),−F}
together with (7) deﬁnes an operator T mapping a function Je ∈ H into a new function
also in H. Since the set S is a convex Borel subset of R4, [yl,1] is compact and the tran-
sition function for y has the Feller property, it is straightforward to verify that T satisﬁes
Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions and is therefore a contraction. Therefore the functional
equation Je = T(Je) has a unique solution. Since, Je(s) = max{Jt(s),−F} satisﬁes the
functional equation it is the unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Necessity. Lemma 3 together with equations (4) and (8) imply
−(1 − j) ˆ F + jW
t(y, ˆ w,F,a) = J
e(s). (28)
It follows from Lemma 2 that that a SSP payoﬀ proﬁle satisﬁes the system of Bellman
equations.
Suﬃciency. Assume a pair of functions W e(s),Je(s) solving (3)-(8) - with (4) holding
as an equality - exists. Be j(s), ˆ w(s), ˆ F(s) the associated policy functions. Any strategy
proﬁle satisfying (26)-(27) can support W e(s),Je(s) as a SSP equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. As in Merlo and Wilson (1995) we prove uniqueness by
showing that the system of functional equations (3)-(8) has a unique ﬁxed point. Lemma
3 implies that the system is recursive, with Je solving the functional equation
J




and W e solving the system formed by (3), (5) and (6) subject to (28).
The proof of Lemma 3 implies that (29) has a unique solution. The Pareto frontier is
strictly decreasing in payoﬀ space. Therefore, there is a unique mapping from the ﬁrm’s
45to the worker’s payoﬀ in all states. Given that Je is unique so is W e.
Proving uniqueness of the SSP outcome amounts to proving that the policy functions
are functions rather than correspondences. Since wealth a does not enter (29) Je(s),Jt(s)
are not functions of wealth and one can solve for
J
t(y,w,F) =
(y − w − τ)∆ + βλ∆
  1
yl Je(y′,w,F)dG
1 − β(1 − λ∆)
, (30)
which is increasing in w. It then follows from equation (3) subject to (28) that ˆ w(s), ˆ F(s)
are unique since the left hand side of (28) is monotonic in ˆ F(s), ˆ w(s) and the right hand
side is unique. The uniqueness of j(s) follows trivially.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using Lemma 3 and taking the limit of (30) as ∆ → 0 yields
(9). The ﬁrm’s reservation wage ¯ w(y,F) is the value of w that equates the two terms
inside the maximum operator in (9). Integrating the second term by parts and equating
yields (12). ˆ F(s) = −Je(s) and ˆ w(s) = min{w, ¯ w(y,F)} follow from (4) evaluated respec-
tively at j = 0 and j = 1, and (8) and the deﬁnition of ¯ w. Finally, consider equation (5).
It is EW e(y′,w,F,a′) = (1 − λ∆)W e (y,w,F,a′) + λ∆
 
W e (y′,w,F,a′)dG. Expanding
















Noticing that if in a SSP equilibrium trade takes place at w in state (y,w,F,a) it is
W e(y,w,F,a) = W t(y,w,F,a), replacing for ∆a using (6) and taking the limit for ∆ → 0
yields (11).
Lemma 4. It is W e(1,σ∗,a) = W t(σ∗,a) and Je(1,σ∗) = Jt(1,σ∗).
Proof. Since a new match is viable by assumption, equation (10) implies W e(1,σ∗,a) =
W t( ˆ w(1,σ∗),F ∗,a) > W u(a − Je(1,σ∗)). It remains to prove that ˆ w(1,σ∗) = w∗ or
equivalently Je(1,σ∗) > −F. Je(1,σ∗) = −F implies that Je(y,σ) = −F and ˆ w(y,σ∗) =
46¯ w(y,F), for any y. It follows that risk-averse workers provide full insurance to risk-neutral
ﬁrms which cannot be eﬃcient.
Proof of Lemma 1. The programme (16) maximises W e(1,σ,α) subject to Je(1,σ) ≥ ¯ J.






r + λG(¯ y)
(33)








where ¯ y is shorthand for ¯ y(σ). Since ¯ y is increasing in w, the ﬁrm indiﬀerence curves are
convex to the origin and their lower contour set is convex. Hence, the programme (16) is
non-concave in σ. Yet, because workers are more risk-averse than ﬁrms their indiﬀerence
curves are more convex to the origin than the ﬁrm ones at any σ. Therefore a point of
tangency is a local maximum and is unique. Existence and uniqueness are not aﬀected
by the constraint F ≥ Fm being binding.
Proof of Proposition 4. Totally diﬀerentiating equations (20) and (11) with respect
to wealth a, using the FOCs W i
a = u′(ci), i = t,u, and noticing that Lemma 4 implies
W e
a(1,σ∗,a) = W t









































where ˆ w = min{w, ¯ w(y′,F)} and si denotes saving.
We guess and verify: 1) the value functions; 2) that dσ∗/da = 0. Suppose W u(a) =
−e−α(ra+b−su)/r and W t(y,σ,a) = −e−α[ra+w−st(σ)]/r with su and st(σ) unknown functions
47independent of wealth. Replacing for W i
aa and W i
a, it is easily veriﬁed that (35) and (36)
form a system of functional equations in the two functions su and st. It is evident that
the solution is independent of a, for given σ∗. It remains to verify that dσ∗/da = 0
in equation (35). From Lemma 4 the worker’s surplus in the Nash maximand (16) is
W e (σ∗,a) − W u(a) = W t (σ∗,a) − W u(a) = −e−α(ra)(e−α(w∗−st(σ∗)) − e−α(b−su))/r. Since
si is independent of wealth, the latter does not enter the ﬁrst order condition for σ.
Proof of Proposition 5. Lemma 4 implies W e(1,σ∗,a) = W t(σ∗,a). Using equation
(11), Remark 1 and the FOC u′(ct) = W t
a, the worker’s marginal rate of substitution





B/[r + λG(¯ y)]






∂w st − λ
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∂F st + λ










a, are shorthand for ct(σ,a),st(σ),W t
a(σ,a).
Given (F,a) select w such that yd(σ,a) = ¯ y(σ). It follows from point 1 in Proposition
4 that ct(σ,a) = cu(a+F) and, from Remark 1, that w(y′,F) = w, ∀y′ > yd, Je(y′,σ) =
−F, ∀y′ < ¯ y and ct(σ,a) = cu(a+F). Replacing in (36) gives st(σ,a) = 0, ∀y > yd. Since
the last integral in the square bracket on the denominator of (37) equals G(¯ y)u′[cu(a+F)],
it follows that the worker’s marginal rate of substitution in equation (37) coincides with
the ﬁrm one in (34) and the contract is Pareto optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1. If γ → 0 it is W e (1,σ∗,a) = W u (a). The contract w = b and
F = 0 is trivially optimal. If γ > 0, the Nash bargaining solution requires W e (1,σ,a) >
W u (a) and w > b, at the optimum. It remains to prove that F > (w − b)/(p(θ) + r).
Proposition 5 implies w = b+rF −su. Hence, it needs to be proved that su > −p(θ)(w−










The left and right hand side of (38) are respectively increasing and decreasing in su. It is
easily checked that w > b implies that the left hand side is smaller than the right hand
48side at su = −p(θ)(w − b)/(p(θ) + r).
Proof of Proposition 6. The left hand side of (18) is strictly increasing in both F and
w while (33) and (37) imply that the right hand side of (18) equals B, the numerator
on the right hand side of (37). Remark 1 or Figure 2 imply that an increase in w at
given (F,a) increases ¯ y and reduces ¯ y, starting from the private optimum characterized
in Proposition 5. An increase in F has the opposite eﬀect. Therefore, at the private
optimum, it is ∂B/∂w = u′′(ct)(∂ct/∂w)2 and ∂B/∂F < u′′(ct)(∂ct/∂w)(1 − ∂ct/∂w),
where normality both terms are negative as consumption is a normal good. It follows
that the right hand side of (18) is strictly decreasing in F and w and, if F increases, w
has to fall to satisfy (18). Equation (13) implies ¯ y falls as a result and, since positive
discounting and uncertainty imply F increases cu(a + F) more than ct(1,σ,a), it follows
from Proposition 4 that W t(1,σ,a) < W u(a + F) and yd increases.
Proof of Proposition 7. It needs to be proved that if cu(a+F) < ct(σ,a) the worker’s
marginal rate of substitution between w and F in equation (37), exceeds the ﬁrm’s one in
equation (34). Replace on the right hand side of (37) for ∂Je(y,σ)/∂w and ∂Je(y,σ)/∂F






















Diﬀerentiating the FOC W t

























where we have dropped the dependence of ct on (σ,a) for space reason.
The left hand side of the inequality is negative by assumption. Since the ﬁrst adden-
dum on the right hand side of (40) is non-negative it is suﬃcient to show that so is the
second addendum. Equation (36) implies st ≥ 0, as ct(σ,a) > cu(a + F) implies that the
marginal utility of consumption is expected to increase. It remains to prove that
−λG(¯ y) ≤ −(∂c
t/∂F)/(∂c
t/∂w). (41)
49From (34) the left hand side of (41) is the actuarially fair rate of exchange dw/dF.
Trading a higher F for lower w at such rate leaves permanent income unchanged, but,
given ct(σ,a) > cu(a + F), reduces future consumption variability. Since u′′′ > 0, ct
increases. Hence, the rate of change dw/dF that leaves ct unchanged, the right hand side
of (41), is smaller in absolute value.
A.2 Data and variables used in Section 5.1
This section contains the data used to construct Figure 3 in section 5.1. The data for the
monthly exit rate from unemployment p(θ) are from the OECD unemployment duration
database. The beneﬁt replacement rates ρ are from Nickell (1997) with the exception of
the Italian replacement rate which has been updated on the basis of information in Oﬃce
of Policy (2002). The average completed job tenure ACJT is from the dataset in Nickell
et al. (2002). It is an average over each country’s sample period.
The notice periods and severance payments in columns 5 to 8 are obtained by applying
the appropriate formulas for legislated notice and severance pay to a tenure equal to the
average completed job tenure in column 4. The relevant formulas for the European coun-
tries come from Grubb and Wells (1993), with the exception of those for Austria, Finland,
Norway, Sweden which are derived from IRS (Industrial Relations Service) (1989). The
size of the legislated severance pay for Italy is the sum of the damages workers are entitled
to if their dismissal is deemed unfair (5 months) plus the amount they are entitled to if
they give up their right to reinstatement (15 months). Our value is consistent with the
50Table 5: Legislated severance pay for blue and white collar workers.
Country p(θ) ρ ACJT fc Notice Sev. pay Notice Sev. pay
BC BC WC WC
(monthly) (%) (yrs) (months) (months) (months) (months)
Australia 0.15 36 7.6 4.2 1 2 1 2
Belgium 0.04 60 24.4 9.2 1.9 - 21a -
Canada 0.29 59 3.5 1.4 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25
Denmark 0.12 90 11.9 0.8 3 - 6 1
Finland 0.15 63 10.4 2.4 4 - 4 -
France 0.05 57 21.1 8 2 1.7 2 1.7
Germany 0.13 63 26.5 4.4 2b - 6b -
Ireland 0.03 37 11.4 19 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
Italy 0.03 40 (3) 41.2 18 (29) 0.5 20 4 20
Netherlands 0.05 70 15.3 5.6 3.3 - 3.3 -
Norway 0.25 65 11.6 1.4 3 - 3 -
New Zealand 0.17 30 6.8 4 1 - 1 -
Portugal 0.06 65 14.9 5.7 2 15 2 15
Spain 0.02 70 26.8 12.9 3 12 3 12
Sweden 0.25 80 10.6 0.8 4b - 4b -
UK 0.1 38 4.5 6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
USA 0.33 50 3.1 1.5 2c - 2c -
a0.86 times length of service in years. This is an approximation of the Claeys formula in
Grubb and Wells (1993).
bFor Germany and Sweden the formulas are a function of both age and length of services. We assumed
employment started at age 20.
cIt applies only to large scale redundancies covered by the Worker Advanced Retraining Notiﬁcation Act.
estimates in Ichino (1996). The formula in Grubb and Wells (1993) wrongly treats as
severance pay the Trattamento di ﬁne rapporto, a form of forced saving workers are
entitled to whatever the reason for termination1, including voluntary quit and summary
dismissal. The data for Portugal and New Zealand come respectively from Foundation
(2002) and CCH New Zealand Ltd (2002). The data for legislation in Australia, Canada
and the United States are from Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (1999).
1On this see Brandolini and Torrini (2002).
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